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ANGOLA: NATION UNDER SIEGE 
After weeks of media speculation about the substantive content of rumored negotiations between the Popular Republic of Angola , 
South Africa, and the United States, the three nations announced on February 16, 1984, that a ceasefire agreement had been reached. 
South African troops would begin a phased withdrawal from occupied Angolan territory in exchange f or Angola 's commitment to 
restrict SWAPO's activities within southern Angola , and the two countries would participate in a joint commission to monitor the 
disengagement process . The communique also provided that at the request of the parties, American representatives could play a role in 
the activities of the commission, and the U.S . quickly moved to open a monitoring center in Windhoek, the Namibian capital . 
Many supporters of African liberation and anti-apartheid activists have questioned the motivation behind Angola's decision to enter 
talks with its long-time adversary, the value of such an agreement between a radical Black nation and the illegitimate apartheid regime, 
and the legitimacy of a U.S . role in the disengagement process. 
This lSSUE BRlEF explores the circumstances surrounding Angola 's disengagement agreement with apartheid South Africa by 
analyzing the external pressures and domestic obstacles confronting Angola . The analysis is preceded by an interview with Dr. Gerald 
Bender, a noted American expert on Angolan affairs and an Associate Prof essor in the School of International Relations at the 
University of Southern California at Los Angeles . 
ANGOLA'S NEGOTIATIONS 
WITH SOUTH AFRICA DO 
NOT REPRESENT EVEN MI-
NOR CHANGES IN EITHER 
THE PRINCIPLES OR THE 
MODUS OPERANDI OF THE 
MPLA GOVERNMENT. 
Gerald Bemler, Associate Professor, University of Southern Califor-
nia at Los Angeles. 
What significance should one attach to the negotiations 
between Angola and South Africa? 
BENDER: Certainly, these negotiations do not represent a 
breakthrough. Angola and South Africa have been hold-
ing direct, bilateral talks since 1976. The bottom line for 
South Africa and the U.S. has always been that Angola 
sign a calendar agreeing to a phased withdrawal of Cuban 
troops. Until that calendar is signed, there will be no 
implementation of UN Resolution 435 by South Africa. 
That is understood in Washington and in Pretoria. Thus 
far , there is no indication that the Angolans are prepared 
to sign such a calendar given the present state of their 
security concerns. 
What changes, if any, are likely to occur in southern Africa 
as a result of these negotiations? 
BENDER: One should not be totally cynical about what is 
transpiring. Doubtlessly , a significant change in atmo-
sphere has occurred . Certainly, Assistant Secretary of 
State Chester Crocker and others-both inside and out-
side the administration-hope that this new atmosphere 
will lead to positive conclusion of an agreement to send 
Cuban troops home and to South Africa's implementation 
of UN Resolution 435. 
It is difficult to say, however, whether or not a new 
change in atmosphere and environment will lead to that. 
Clearly, things were going nowhere before. Now, with all 
the parties talking to each other on a regular basis, the 
time is more propitious for a settlement than before. 
Nonetheless, one cannot assume that success is 
imminent. 
Would the removal of Cuban troops necessarily mean that 
the South Africans would implement UN Resolution 435? 
BENDER: The favorite game of "Southern Africa Watch-
ers" is speculating on Pretoria's intentions in Namibia. 
One of the things that makes this game both interesting 
and difficult is the fact that it is not clear that Pretoria 
knows what it wants to do. There are some signs that 
down the road South Africa has laid further conditions 
beyond Angolan agreement to remove the Cuban troops. 
Some senior South African officials have suggested pri-
vately that they may require an agreement for an 
MPLNUNIT A reconciliation before South Africa with-
draws from Namibia. The Director of the Pretoria Strate-
gic Studies Center has indicated that South Africa would 
demand further conditions once the Cuban troops prob-
lem is solved . 
The history of South African negotiations over Namibia 
is filled with examples of excuses by Pretoria to hold up 
negotiations. One day, they will stop offering excuses and 
actually get out of Namibia. The question is whether that 
is now or some time in the future. 
Does Angola's willingness to negotiate with Pretoria reflect 
any fundamental change in MPLA policies or principles? 
BENDER: Angola's negotiations with South Africa do not 
represent even minor changes in either the principles or 
the modus operandi of the MPLA government. Talks be-
tween the two countries, which have become more public 
in the last few years, have been conducted on an ad hoc 
basis ever since Angolan independence in 1975. Certainly, 
the agenda for these talks has broadened from solving 
very concrete, specific problems to discussing much wid-
er, less specific issues . The Angolan government has said 
all along that it wishes to have normal relations with all 
governments regardless of ideology, economic system, or 
alignment as long as those governments respect Angolan 
sovereignty. That includes the Soviet Union, the United 
States, Cuba, and South Africa. The problem has been on 
the South African side. The Pretoria regime does not rec-
ognize the government in Luanda, and has tried to desta-
bilize-if not overthrow-that government both directly 
and indirectly. It is difficult to carry on normal relations 
with a neighbor that behaves this way. Therefore it is 
perfectly reasonable for Luanda and Pretoria to talk with 
each other as they are doing now. Both countries have 
considerable mutual interests, and the first round of nego-
tiations has advanced each country's interests . In this 
case both countries win. 
These talks do not affect Angola's relationship with 
Cuba in any way , however. If this is a preliminary step 
toward a settlement in Namibia that would ultimately lead 
to a reduction in the number of Cuban combat troops, 
then it would indirectly have some effect on Angola's 
relations overall-not just with Cuba. I would assume that 
the Cubans would be encouraging these negotiations, but 
I doubt that Angola consulted Cuba. Angola knows its 
best interests and would pursue them even if Cuba's per-
ception were different. But I doubt that there is any differ-
ence on this issue. 
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Does the current situation constitute evidence that the Rea-
gan administration's policy of "Constructive Engagement" 
is working? 
BENDER: Well, it is too early to tell whether or not con-
structive engagement is working. It is certainly not possi-
ble to say that it has been successful. One needs to recall 
that constructive engagement as spelled out is a policy 
that says that in exchange for better relations with the 
United States, South Africa had to make progress on two 
fronts: one , move away from apartheid internally, and 
two, accept UN Resolution 435 and get out of Namibia. 
Now they certainly have received warmer relations and 
material gains from the United States, as well as under-
standing and assistance in international forums and so 
forth. The U.S. has delivered its side; what is not clear is 
whether or not South Africa will deliver its side of the 
bargain. On the South African domestic front , the key 
change that has occurred since Reagan is the new consti-
tution which brings Coloreds and Asians into the political 
process. There are two ways to read that. Not unexpect-
edly, the Reagan administration reads that positively. 
Those who oppose the administration's South African 
policy, particularly constructive engagement, read it neg-
atively, which of course is my own reading. Other than 
that we have seen growth in repression and little indica-
tion that the South African government is closer to mov-
ing away from apartheid in 1984 than it was in 1981. So 
constructive engagement has failed on one side-the 
South African side-of the bargain. 
Most attention has been focused on the Namibian side. 
In fact many people seem to have forgotten about the 
requirement to move away from apartheid. We cannot 
claim successes at this point , and I am sorry to see that 
Secretary of State George Schultz has claimed a break-
through . He ought to know that there are many difficult 
decisions down the road , the most important being the 
question of the Cubans, over which there has been no 
breakthrough. 
Is there anything you want to add to sum all this up? 
BENDER: It is disturbing to pick up an American newspa-
per like the Washington Times in early 1984 and see Hold-
en Roberto described as a great Angolan leader, as a great 
hope for Unjted States interests in Angola. One not only 
has a feeling of deja vu with a character like Roberto re-
emerging, but also a heavy heart . It shows once again that 
when Americans do take notice of Angola, it is often for 
very selfish reasons that are detached from reality and 
have little to do with the Angolan people's well being. I 
fear that this new American attention to Roberto will do 
the Angolan people more harm than good. That is one 
reason why I personally hope that the present series of 
negotiations will be successful. Hopefully , there will then 
emerge a situation whereby with the withdrawal of the 
South Africans , the Cubans and any others , Angolans will 
for once be able to take charge of their own destiny. □ 
RESTRUCTURING ANGOLA 
While the process of social reconstruction is never 
easy, the tasks which the Popular Republic of Angola face 
are particularly complex.The elements of internal difficul-
ties reflect the legacy of its 500-year history as one of the 
most brutally exploited nations on the African continent. 
Angola was the principal African supplier to the slave 
trade, and that genocidal era has resulted in Angola cur-
rently being underpopulated. Although twice the size of 
Texas and the second largest sub-Saharan nation, UN 
officials have estimated its national population to be no 
more than some seven million. Several of its governmen-
tal districts are virtually uninhabited, and the geographi-
cal isolation of various ethnic groups has inhibited the 
development of national unity . The decimation of Ango-
la's population makes adequate defense of its vast terri-
tory almost impossible and leaves the country vulnerable 
to outside attacks and prolonged occupation. 
As the least developed colonial power, Portugal was 
forced to invite foreign multinational exploitation of its 
colonies' resources . Most of the Portuguese settlers were 
themselves illiterate and unskilled , so that even the most 
menial jobs were traditionally filled by the newest arriv-
als, not Africans. Education was never a governmental 
priority , so churches played a primary training role. No 
more than 3 percent of the la9d was ever cultivated during 
the colonial era when the agricultural sector was geared to 
the production of export commodities, not nutritional 
self-sufficiency. Coffee alone accounted for 34.5 percent 
of all export income. Except for petty manufactures like 
beer, soda, and processed food, there were virtually no 
industries in Angola during colonialism, for the Portu-
guese settlers were content to use revenues from oil and 
diamond exports to import almost everything. Foreign 
multinationals were allowed to effectively administer 
states within a state in their areas of control and establish 
their own security regulations and labor practices. The 
central colonial government did little but maintain an in-
frasructure that met the needs of foreign investors and 
supervise the brutal contract labor system which allowed 
investors in both the agricultural and industrial sectors to 
reap great profits . Angola still suffers from the legacy of 
Portugal 's backward rule . 
Upon winning independence in 1975, the MPLA gov-
ernment attempted to develop an industrial sector and to 
end the country's reliance on imports, but has faced se-
vere problems . Most of Angola's infrastructure was dev-
astated during the anti-colonial struggle and subsequent 
South African/UNIT A invasions . Since the Portuguese 
had never allowed Africans to gain technical, managerial, 
or administrative skills, the massive flight of Portuguese 
settlers after independence left inexperienced Angolans 
to cope with all the country's economic and security prob-
lems. Not surprisingly, diamond and on-shore oil produc-
tion fell drastically in the years immediately following 
independence and has not fully revived since then. How-
ever, by 1982 offshore petroleum drilling approached the 
1969 maximum pre-independence levels. By that time, 
however, falling world prices for Angola's primary ex-
ports had wiped out any advantages which might have 
been recovered. Although Gabon and Nigeria are the only 
sub-Saharan nations that produce more oil than Angola, 
Angola's trade balance deteriorated from $471 million sur-
plus in 1980 to a $5 million deficit in 1981. Although 1983 
oil production rose approximately 30 percent, this gain 
was partially offset by falling prices and the doubling of 
long-planned investments in new oilfields and offshore 
production. Since oil is the source for approximately 85 
percent of Angola's foreign exchange and 65 percent of its 
total government revenue, Angola's fate is tied to factors 
far beyond its control. 
In addition to its problems with the industrial sector, 
and despite its meager populace, the Angolan government 
has found it difficult to feed its people. Experts consider 
only 8 percent of Angola's land to be even potentially 
arable, and only 4 percent of the total available land is 
now being utilized. While MPLA has made the production 
of food a priority, its efforts have been thwarted at almost 
every turn . The distribution of supplies and transportation 
of produce to markets has been a perpetual problem, for 
two thirds of all trucks within the country were driven off 
and abandoned by the defeated settlers immediately after 
independence, and 149 bridges were destroyed in the 
South African invasion which followed. Although these 
bridges had been rebuilt by 1980, recurring South African 
invasions have prevented any reliance on their use, and 
UNIT A forces continue to target the few remaining trucks 
and bridges for sabotage. The Benguela railroad, the sole 
cross-country rail link, has been another prime target. As 
a result of these difficulties, provincial towns and capitals 
are better stocked with food than the national capital of 
Luanda. where population has doubled from the mass 
exodus of peasants escaping the terrorism of UNIT A and 
South African forces. The drought which plagues the re-
gion has exacerbated this food crisis, and a rural popula-
tion which could be capable of producing for the entire 
nation now needs for itself the little it can produce. After 
two successive years of drought, Angola has had to begin 
bartering oil for food to supply the hard hit urban areas 
where returning Angolan exiles and Namibian and Zair-
ean refugees are clustered. Western analysts predict that 
it will be at least 1990 before Angola will be able to achieve 
iagricultural self-sufficiency, and even then only if export 
earnings allow for the purchase of the materials needed 
for food production. 
However, these same analysts have also predicted that 
any future rise in Angola's export revenues will be eroded 
by pressure from past due creditors and increasing mili-
tary costs. In 1981-1982, Angola had to reverse its tradi-
tionally cautious borrowing policies and double its debt 
from 1.1 to 2.2 billion dollars to meet foreign currency 
needs . For the first time, Angola entered the Euro-curren-
cy market but requested trade credits for imports, not 
cash. Since the MPLA government was committed to 
meeting the needs of all, not just those of white settlers, 
domestic spending had been soaring and public expendi-
tures had jumped 25 percent. By 1982-1983, various fac-
tors had forced the government to cut subsidies, end in-
vestments in new projects, and collect personal income 
tax for the first time since 1976. Defense needs accounted 
for nearly half of Angola's budget, and after the South 
African invasions and occupations of August 1981 and 
December 1983 , war needs were expected to continue to 
take precedence over civilian concerns. 
Despite this bleak picture, MPLA conducted the coun-
try 's first-ever literacy and vaccination campaigns, re-
opened provincial hospitals and imported the pharmaceu-
ticals to supply them, established an indoor/outdoor 
school system which operates in two shifts to meet de-
mand , and developed a National Language Institute to 
document and compile the indigenous Angolan languages. 
All seem to agree, however, that Angola's economy will 
remain depressed until and unless a solution to its security 
problems can be found. D 
REAGAN WATCH: U.S. POLICY ON ANGOLA 
While the legitimate national concerns of developing 
nations have typically been subsumed under the strategic 
concerns of U.S. policymakers, and Western aid was 
knowingly utilized against the increasingly effective liber-
lrtion movements operating within each of Portugal's Afri-
can colonies, Angola's national aspirations have been ac-
tively opposed by the U.S. government for at least 
twenty-three years. Angola was the only Portuguese colo-
. ny with a range of strategic minerals as comprehensive as 
those found in South Africa, and American firms had a 
virtual monopoly over the extraction and production of 
Angolan oil. By 1970, Angola was the world's fifth largest 
diamond exporter, and the South African firm which con-
trolled the Angola diamond industry had extensive U.S. 
interests. Also at stake was NATO's strategic domination 
of the south Atlantic Ocean, for Zaire virtually has no 
coast; and world outcry over South Africa' s illegal occu-
pation of Namibia suggested a challenge to the West's 
continued use of Walvis Bay. Neither Portugal, South 
Africa, nor the U.S. was prepared to lose access to Ango-
la's resources, and each did its best to prevent Angola's 
independence. 
Between the end of the slave trade and 1961, the U.S. 
had no specific policy towards Angola. By 1961 the U.S., 
already embroiled in the "Congo crisis," and alarmed by 
Cuba's relationship with newly independent African na-
tions, saw "communists" lurking behind every national 
independence movement. Thus, when in 1961 the MPLA 
launched the armed struggle phase of Angola' s anti-colo-
nial struggle (after five years of non-violent protest 
against Portuguese rule had been brutally repressed), the 
Kennedy administration was primarily concerned not 
with Angola, but with the East-West implications of an-
other central African conflict. Although the U.S. respond-
ed to the development of an Angolan war of national liber-
ation by publicly urging Portugal to prepare Angola for 
eventual independence, the shift in diplomatic rhetoric 
was actually an attempt to diffuse the world outcry over 
the U.S. role in the assassination of Lumumba and to 
portray the Kennedy administration as a friend of African 
liberation. Despite the public proclamations of support for 
Angolan independence, 1961 also marked the initiation of 
CIA military and financial assistance to Angolan organi-
zations considered susceptible to Western direction and 
capitalist orientation. First to receive such aid was Hold-
en Roberto , protege and brother-in-law of Mobutu, the 
U.S. chosen leader for the Congo (now Zaire). 
While covertly supporting Black movements that 
would protect Western interests in the event of Angola's 
independence , U.S . military and financial aid to Portugal 
was-never more than briefly interrupted. Successive ad-
ministrations trained and equipped Portugal's fighting 
forces , shared anti-guerilla techniques developed by U.S. 
troops in Vietnam, subsidized Portugal's war-strapped 
economy, and supplied the toxic substances used in wag-
ing biological and chemical warfare against the civilian 
populations of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and 
Mozambique. Though this logistical support was justified 
by citation of NATO treaty obligations, the 1970 leak of 
the "Tar Baby Memorandum" revealed the real foundation 
of U. S policy to be the assumption that white settler re-
gimes in southern Africa were "there to stay" and were 
natural U.S. allies. The U.S. intelligence network seem-
ingly was unaware, however, not only of the strength of 
southern African liberation movements, but the extent of 
anti-war sentiment within Portugal itself. Surprised when 
a coup unseated Portugal's dictatorship in 1974 and the 
new junta established mechanisms to hasten the errd of the 
colonial period, the U.S. stepped up its campaign to en-
sure that a "moderate" government would assume power 
in Angola, which had always been considered the "prize 
jewel" of the Portuguese empire. 
MPLA, the oldest Angolan liberation movement and 
the only one with a truly multi-ethnic character, had al-
ways alarmed the U.S. with its capacity to effectively 
govern and its anti-imperialist ideology. During the four-
teen-year war of Angola's independence, the U.S. had 
supported at least three other movements, each profess-
ing various ideologies and tribal loyalties but sharing the 
CIA's goal of destroying MPLA. Roberto's FNLA move-
ment claimed to seek the reformulation of the 14th centu-
ry Bakongo kingdom through the unification of southern 
Zaire and northern Angola. FLEC, the Front for the Lib-
eration of the Cabinda Enclave, formed in 1963 after 
MPLA opened a Cabinda front and sought the secession 
of the province containing the greatest known source of 
Angola's oil reserves . While FLEC never gained much 
credibility, the CIA had greater success with UNIT A, 
formed by dissident FNLA member Jonas Savimbi in 
1966. UNITA, originally only a southern counterpart of 
FNLA with the aim of uniting the Ovimbundu people of 
southern Angola and northern Namibia, was a beneficiary 
of massive CIA support and direct South African aid. 
Despite this , a vast propaganda effort portrayed Savimbi 
and Roberto as the leaders of authentic liberation move-
ments and characterized MPLA as an elite movement of 
intellectuals and "mulattoes." Mercenaries were recruited 
from among the population of unemployed Vietnam veter-
ans, and special appeals on behalf of FNLA and UNIT A 
were made to the African-American community's Pan-
African sentiment. Covert aid to such insurgent forces 
REAGAN WATCH (CONT.) 
was at least theoretically ended on May 25, 1978, by Presi-
dent Carter; and a ban on covert action in Angola without 
Congressional notification was later codified through the 
Clark Amendment. However, since the inauguration of 
the Reagan administration another movement, COMIRA 
has been promoted in the Western press; and as late as fall 
of 1983, a Newsweek cover story on the CIA listed Angola 
as one of three African sites for U.S. covert action. 
It was in 1966 that South Africa first launched air strikes 
from its Namibian bases against MPLA-liberated zones, 
and South African troops began to fight.alongside Portu-
guese combat troops. However, preoccupied by its own 
war against Vietnam, a broad-based domestic anti-war 
movement, and an African-American community that 
was increasingly conscious of its ties to Africa, the U.S. 
could ill afford to duplicate South Africa's direct support 
of Angola's Portuguese settlers. On August 5, 1975, three 
months before the scheduled date of Angola's indepen-
dence, regiments of South Africa's regular army invaded 
Angola under the pretext of protecting its hydro-electric 
dam complex built in collaboration with the Portuguese 
just inside the Angolan border. The U.S. was silent, but 
arranged for an airlift of French, U.S., Belgian, and West 
German arms to South Africa and UNITA, and FNLA 
forces massed on the Namibian side of the Angolan bor-
der. MPLA repelled the South African invasion with the 
aid of Cuban troops and established the Popular Republic 
of Angola on November 11, 1975. The next month, the 
U.S. government ordered Boeing to withhold delivery of 
two planes worth more than $200 million- already paid 
for by the MPLA government-and forced Gulf to cease 
operations and withhold payments, thus causing Angola 
to lose $1.5 million per day in foreign exchange. The U.S. 
then vetoed Angola's first request for UN membership. 
This pattern of South African aggression and U.S. hostil-
ity toward Angola has been clarified both by President 
Reagan publicly supporting Savimbi and defining South 
Africa as a friend of the U.S., and by South Africa's 
citation of the U.S. invasion of Grenada as a precedent for 
its invasion of Angola in December 1983. 
The principle tenets of U.S. policy toward Angola have 
remained distressingly consistent. Diplomatic, military, 
and economic means once used to forestall the emergence 
of a sovereign Angola are now utilized in an attempt to 
destabilize Angola and hinder its economic development. 
Both Democratic and Republican presidents have been 
concerned solely with Angola's geopolitical significance, 
mineral resources, and oil reserves, and Angola has be-
come a model case for advocates of U.S. covert action. 
The improvements in U.S. policy have been due to inter-
national public pressure , not from the recognition of An-
gola's inherent right to self-determination. D 
Although successive U.S. administrations have railed against the continued presence of Cuban troops, the Reagan administra1ion 
has taken the most belligerent attitude and has urged that the termination of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia be linked to 
the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. Periodically, media reports focus attention on the relationship between Cuba and Angola 
and allude to supposed rifts between the two governments over new developments in the southern Africa region. Only rarely are the 
Cuban and/or Angolan government's views directly presented. The following are translated excerpts from an official statement which 
received little coverage by American media. 
JOINT DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF CUBA AND ANGOLA 
More than two years ago, the Governments of the Popular Republic of 
Angola and the Republic of Cuba, in their joint statement of February 4, 
1983 , divulged worldwide, expressed very clearly their principled posi-
tion regarding the tense situation that prevails in the Southern Cone of 
Africa. 
The time elapsed has but confirmed the fairness of all aspects included 
in the aforementioned statement, which has earned approval of interna-
tional public opinion and has been welcomed by virtually all countries of 
the World, with the shameful exception of the Governments of the 
United States of America and South Africa , who have stuck for years to 
the harmful formula of the so-called " linkage" that lacks any legal or 
moral base and has been repudiated by everyone except their authors. 
The Government of the Popular Republic of Angola has kept the 
Government of Cuba fully informed of the details of the conversations 
that is currently conducting with South Africa and the United States, 
through which Angola seeks , based on principles, a negotiated solution 
to the confict that over the years has confronted the Angolan people with 
the South African aggressors , and to create conditions that will make 
viable the immediate instrumentation of Resolution 435/78 of the United 
Nations Security Council and the independence of Namibia. 
Rigorously abiding by what is estahlished in the aforementioned joint 
statement , the Governments of Cuba and Angola reiterate that they 
would resume , by their own decision and exercising their sovereign will , 
the implementation of the gradual withdrawal of the Cuban internation-
alist military contingent , as soon as the following requirements are 
fulfilled : 
I. Unilateral withdrawal of the racists troops of South Africa from 
Angoian territory. 
2. Strict implementation of Resolution 435/78 of the United Nations 
Security Council, access of Namibia to true independence and total 
withdrawal of the South African troops that are illegally occupying that 
country . 
3. Cessation of all acts of direct aggression or threat of aggression 
against the Popular Republic of Angola on the part of South Africa , the 
United States of America and their allies. 
Together with these three requirements it will also be an indispensable 
condition, as was expressed by the Government of Angola through the 
statement made by President Eduardo Dos Santos on August 26, 1983, 
the termination of all assistance to the counter-revolutionary organiza-
tion UNIT A and any other puppet group, on the part of South Africa , the 
United States of America and their allies . ... 
The Government of Cuba, on behalf of the Cuban people, pays due 
homage to the heroism of the Angolan people, whom for almost a quarter 
of a century have waged a liberation war. ... 
The Government of the Popular Republic of Angola expresses the 
unlimited gratitude of the Angolan people for the internationalist assis-
tance that for two decades the Cuban people have provided to their 
liberation struggle .... 
Both Governments express their admiration and solidarity with the 
heroic struggle that the peoples of Namibia and South Africa wage under 
the leaderships of their sole and legitimate representatives , SW APO and 
ANC, against the opprobious system of apartheid, and they reaffirm 
their conviction that this horrendous institution is historically con-
demned to disappear. □ 
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